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THE COMPATIBILITY OF DIVINE DETERMINISM
AND HUMAN FREEDOM: A MODEST PROPOSAL
David P. Hunt

I begin by developing an argument for the conclusion that God's

causally determining everything we do is compatible with human freedom. Libertarian theists (and not just libertarians) will suspect that
something must be wrong with the argument. They are right, and T
explain why. I then point out that certain influential arguments for the
conclusion that God's foreknowing everything we do is compatible with
human freedom are in the same logical boat as this fallacious argument. I look closely at tvvo of these, showing how they go astray. I
conclude with some morals suggested by this cautionary tale.

Since omnipotence concerns only power and says nothing about its exercise, a being might be omnipotent even if it never actually did anything.
Such a being would obviously not be God, who is (among other things)
creator of the universe. l But how much of an omnipotent being's powers
must the being exercise in order to count as God? Some theists will be
inclined to impose relatively minimal requirements on the deployment
of God's omnipotent powers, while others can be expected to take the
opposite tack. The latter position is probably more interesting from a
metaphysical standpoint (leaving it for now an open question whether it
is interestingly true or interestingly false!). It is therefore worth considering how a "maximalist" answer to this question might be defended,
and what morals might be drawn from the success or failure of this
defense.
I

If an omnipotent being is one that can do anything (that is doable), an
"omnificent" being (let us say) is one that does do everything (that is done).
This is, of course, the merest gesture in the direction of an adequate concept; there is no reason to think that a philosophically sound analysis of
omnificence" would be any easier to obtain, or any less fraught with controversy, than the corresponding analysis of omnipotence. 2 For the purposes of this paper, however, the following may be sufficient elaboration:
II

A being X is omnificent iff everything Y that happens is such that X
uniquely determines Y to happen, i.e., something X does is (causally)
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sufficient for Y to happen, and nothing else is (causally) sufficient for
Y to happen. 3
With the concept of omnificence so understood, we can state our maximalist response to the question as follows: for a being to count as God, the
being must be not only omnipotent but also omnificent.
How should this "doctrine of divine omnificence" be received? The fact
is that it has a number of things going for it. It fits well with the
Aristotelian view that God is pure actuality; it sanctions a straightforward
approach to God's role as Ultimate Explainer; it provides a superlative
foundation for divine sovereignty and providence; and it enjoys other
advantages as well. There is one consideration, however, that would
appear to trump this doctrine's manifold merits. If God does everylhing,
then creatures do nothing; and if there is no free agency (other than God's),
there is no moral responsibility (other than God's). This is a religiously
(not to mention humanistically) unacceptable consequence. It is for this
reason, presumably, that theists who might otherwise find much to attract
them in the doctrine of divine omnificence-theists like, for example, the
great medieval theologians Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, and the great
Reformers Luther and Calvin-approach this doctrine only asymptotically,
as it were, seeking in the end to distinguish it from their own positions, or
at least to qualify it in such a way that human responsibility is somehow
preserved.
But perhaps this skittishness in the face of divine omnificence is urlwarranted. Theists, no less than nontheists, like to have their cake and eat it
whenever possible, and this is arguably a case in which it is indeed possible.
Let's first restate the problem a bit more carefully. If God is omnificent,
omnificence is presumably one of His essential attributes; so God would be
omnificent in every world in which He exists. Moreover, there is no world
in which He does not exist. So
(a)

God exists in all possible worlds and is omnificent in all possible worlds.

Now consider some presumptive instance of agency whose freedom we
may fear threatened by the doctrine of divine omnificence-say,
(b)

Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

If (b) is true, then so is

(c)

Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

But given (a) and the analysis of 'omnificence', it follows from (c) that
(d)

God uniquely determines Adam to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

And (d), the theological faint-hearts affirm, is inconsistent with (b), at least
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on any robustly libertarian understanding of what it is for someone to do
something freely.
If the following argument is sound, however, this concern would
appear to be misplaced. Whatever one might think about the consistency
of (b) and (d), surely (b) and (c) are consistent with each other. Given that
(b) entails (c), these two propositions could be inconsistent only if (b) were
logically impossible. But no one who is seriously concerned that divine
omnificence threatens creaturely free agency will allow that (b) is logically
impossible, since in that case there could be no Adamic freedom for divine
omnificence to threaten. But if (b) and (c) are consistent, then so are (b) and
(d)-at least on the assumption of divine omnificence. For given (a),
propositions (c) and (d) are strictly equivalent to each other-there is no logically possible world in which one is true and the other is false. But if (d) is
strictly equivalent to (c), and (c) is consistent with (b), it follows necessarily
that (b) is consistent with (d). There is no good reason, then, to reject the
doctrine of divine omnificence---at least there is no good reason rooted in a
concern for creaturely free agency.
Call this defense of divine omnificence 'The Proposal.' Since the advantages of divine omnificence are real, and The Proposal shows this doctrine's only identified disadvantage to be bogus, theists ought to embrace
divine omnificence.
II

I don't suppose for a moment that The Proposal is really sound. This is a
"modest proposal" in the Swiftian sense: the compatibility of divine omnificence with libertarian freedom and the argument just used to demonstrate
this compatibility are about as worthy of serious acceptance as Jonathan
Swift's satirical proposal for alleviating the famine in Ireland and the
sophistical arguments he marshaled on behalf of this scheme. But if this is
correct (and it surely is), where exactly does The Proposal go astray?4
At the heart of The Proposal is an argument of this form:
(1) P is consistent with q
(2) q is strictly equivalent to r

therefore
(3) P is consistent with r

There are at least a couple of ways of interpreting the propositional relations which occur in this argument-form, and the surface plausibility of
The Proposal not surprisingly turns on the resulting equivocation.
One univocal reading of these relations goes something like this (call
this the" A-reading"):
(lA) There is nothing about p, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that q is also true.
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(2A) There is no difference in the informational content of q and rthey constitute the very same fact.
Therefore
(3A) There is nothing about p, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that r is also true.
This is the more colloquial of the two readings, and it is correspondingly
less precise. What exactly is "informational content," and what are its
identity conditions? And what is it to take a fact "just by itself"-especially when considering this fact's implications for some other fact? But
the penumbra of vagueness surrounding these concepts is not so murky
as to render this argument-form unusable. If q and r are the very same
fact, any proposition that does not effectively exclude the possibility of q
cannot effectively exclude the possibility of r. This is surely a valid
inference, even if there are outstanding questions about how best to analyze the inference.
Here is the other univocal reading (call this the "B-reading"):
(1B) There is a possible world in which p and q are both true.
(2B) In every possible world q and r have the same truth-value.
Therefore
(3B) There is a possible world in which p and r are both true.
This argument-form, too, is valid. Moreover, it's clearly different from the
A-reading, and the difference is not merely verbal. For example, when q =
2+2=5 and r = James is a married bachelor, (2B) is true (because q and r are both
necessarily false) but (2A) seems not to be true: surely q and r cannot be saying the same thing (can they?), since the one is about arithmetical relations
between numbers and the other is about the marital status of a person.
Likewise, when p = Caesar died in 44 Be and q = There is a greatest prime number, (1B) is false, since there is no possible world in which there is a greatest
prime number, and so a fortiori there is no possible world in which there is a
greatest prime number and Caesar died in 44 BC But given this same valuation for p and q, (lA) is intuitively true: while the existence of a greatest
prime number is indeed inconsistent with certain facts, the facts with which
it is inconsistent are the various axioms and lemmas making up the premises
of the Prime Number Theorem, not the fact of Caesar dying in 44 BC
Given these two valid but distinct argument-forms, which one offers the
best way of understanding The Proposal? This question turns out to be
moot, since neither one yields a sound argument. Substituting (b) for p, (c)
for q, and (d) for r, the A-reading becomes
(la) There is nothing about Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge
of good and evil, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that
Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is also true.
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(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of Adam eats
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and God determines
Adam to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil-they constitute the very same fact.
Therefore
(3a) There is nothing about Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge
of good and evil, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that
God determines Adam to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil is also true.
So interpreted, there is absolutely nothing to recommend the second
premise of the argument. s
Perhaps the A-reading's failure is rooted in its relative lack of logical
precision, and the argument will show itself to better effect when the
notions of 'consistency' and' equivalence' are cashed out in terms of possible worlds. Here, then, is the B-reading:
(lb) There is a possible world in which Adam freely eats of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil and Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil are both true.
(2b) In every possible world Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of
good and C'ui! and God uniquely determines Adam to eat of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil have the same truth-value.
Therefore
(3b) There is a possible world in which Adam freely eats of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil and God uniquely determines Adam to
eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil are both true.
This argument is perhaps not so obviously defective as its A-reading counterpart, but it fails nonetheless. The argument is supposed to refute the
critie of divine omnifieence who objects that universal divine determinism
is incompatible with creaturely libertarian freedom. According to this critie, if the doctrine of divine omnifieence is true, there is no world in which
Adam (or anyone) freely does anything. But in that case (lb) is clearly
false. Insofar, then, as The Proposal appeals to (lb) as a premise, it simply
begs the question against the critic of divine omnificence.
The Proposal is seductive because it's easy to miss the equivocation that
occurs when one's attention shifts from the truth of its premises to the validity of its inference. 'Consistency' has a well-established meaning in ordinary language and it is therefore natural to construe the first premise in
accordance with the A-reading, on which it is true; 'strict equivalence' is a
term of art and it is therefore natural to construe the second premise in
accordance with the B-reading, on which it is also true. Anyone approaching The Proposal in a spirit of charity will therefore find it easy to interpret
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the premises so that both are true. As to whether the conclusion follows
from the premises, the most straightforward way to operationalize the
notion of 'consistency' when assessing the argument's validity is in the
explicitly modal terms provided by the B-reading, and on this interpretation
The Proposal is clearly valid. Unfortunately the B-reading of premise one is
not a neutral paraphrase displaying the meaning of this premise and differing from the A-reading only in its greater analytical utility; it is an alternative
to the meaning provided by the A-reading, and it is on the A-reading that
this premise was judged to be true. In fact (as we have seen), the opponent
of divine omnificence who regards (la) as unexceptionable, and on those
groLmds concedes the first premise, does not accept (lb)-indeed, her very
reason for opposing divine omnificence commits her to the position that, if
God is omnificent, (lb) is false.
III

No one to my knowledge has embraced The Proposal, at least not in the
bald fashion in which it has been presented here. What makes it worth
refuting is that similar arguments crop up in other contexts. The contemporary debate over the compatibility of human freedom and divine omniscience provides an especially rich breeding ground for such arguments. I
want now to look at two examples of compatibility arguments which,
though they concern omniscience rather than omnificence, nevertheless
belong to the same logical family as The Proposal. One of these is The
Proposal's identical twin, while the other is merely a close relation.
The first example comes from Ted Warfield, so let's call it 'Warfield's
Argument. '6 Warfield's Argument is directed against "theological incompatibilists" whose doubts about the compatibility of divine omniscience
and human freedom rest on grounds of the following sort. Given the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience,

(ex) God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possible worlds.
Now consider some presumptive instance of agency whose freedom we
may fear threatened by the doctrine of divine omniscience--say,

(P)

Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD.

If (b) is true, then so is
(y)

It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD.

But given (ex), it follows from (y) that
(D)

God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD.
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The theological incompatibilist then avers that (p) and (b) are inconsistent
with each other. In defense of this claim, the incompatibilist appeals to
some version of a familiar argument, dating back at least to St. Augustine
and revived in a particularly powerful form by Nelson Pike,B to the effect
that, necessarily, Plantinga (i) can fail to climb Mount Rushmore in 2000
AD if (P) is true, but (ii) cannot fail to climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD if
(b) is true; hence (P) and (b) are not cotenable. Call this argument for theological incompatibilism, in its most cogent form (whatever that might be),
the AT!.
Warfield's strategy in responding to the foregoing concern is to ignore
the ATI and construct instead a direct defense of the consistency of (P) and
(6). This defense is identical in form to the one The Proposal offers on
behalf of the consistency of (b) and (d); that is, Warfield's Argument
employs the argument-form
(1) P is consistent with q
(2) q is strictly equivalent to r

therefore
(3) P is consistent with r 9

But for p Warfield's Argument substitutes (P) instead of The Proposal's (b);
for q it substitutes (y) instead of (X); and for r it substitutes (6) instead of (d).
In defense of the relevant substitution-instance of (1), Warfield notes that
he is not offering an argument against the "logical fatalist," for whom the
denial of (P) is supposed to follow from (y) alone. Rather, he is defending
the foreknowledge component of the doctrine of divine omniscience from
concerns that have been raised within the ongoing debate over divine foreknowledge, and there is (he avers) "no participant in the foreknowledge
debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who does not accept the falsity of
logical fatalism." For tills reason, he adds, "[r]elevant interlocutors ... have
no room to disagree with tills assumption."10
It should be clear from our analysis of The Proposal what is wrong with
this line. The "relevant interlocutors" agree with Warfield that the existence of true future-tense propositions about human actions does not by
itself have any deleterious consequences for human freedom. But tills only
means that they accept the first premise of Warfield's Argument under the
A-reading, which parses the argument as follows:
(1 a) There is nothing about Plantinga will freely climb Mount

Rushmore in 2000 AD, just by itself, willch rules out the possibility that It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount
Rushmore in 2000 AD is also true.
(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of It was true
in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD
and God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD-they constitute the very same fact.
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Therefore
(3a) There is nothing about Plantinga will freely climb Mount
Rushmore in 2000 AD, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount
Rushmore in 2000 AD is also true.

But (2a) is prima facie absurd: on the A-reading, the second premise of
Warfield's Argument is no more acceptable than the second premise of
The Proposal. 11
This leaves the B-reading, which Warfield himself clearly favors. So
construed, Warfield's Argument looks like this:
(1~)

There is a possible world in which Plantinga will freely climb
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and It was true in 50 AD that
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 are both true.

(2~)

In every possible world It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will
climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD have the same
truth-value.

Therefore
(3~)

There is a possible world in which Plantinga will freely climb
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 are both true.

But why should this rendition have any more bite for the "relevant interlocutors" than the A-Reading? Theological incompatibilists, after all, will
either deny (1~) or regard it as the very point at issue, given the doctrine of
divine omniscience.
Warfield has recently responded in this journal to two published critiques of his argument. 12 One comes from William Hasker,13 who claims
(among other things) that Warfield's Argument assumes (~) to be logically
possible. Warfield's counterclaim is that (~)'s logical possibility is not an
"assumption" but "a strict consequence of something Hasker and I both
accept, namely, that [(~)] and [(y)] are compatible," adding: "I assume that
there is nothing dialectically inappropriate in accepting a proposition
implied by a claim of my opponent."14
But Hasker and like-minded critics of divine foreknowledge clearly do
not accept that there is a logically possible world in which (~) is true if (a) is
true, so a fortiori they do not accept that there is a logically possible world
in which both (~) and (y) are true if (a) is true. What they can be expected
to accept, given their rejection of logical fatalism, is the A-reading of the
first premise, and this reading is useless to Warfield's Argument. It is of
course open to Warfield to dismiss the A-reading's construals of 'consistency' and 'strict equivalence', perhaps on the grounds that they are not sufficiently well-behaved from a logical standpoint to be countenanced in polite
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philosophical conversation. But then Warfield should be questioning
whether and in what sense his opponents really accept the first premise of
Warfield's Argument, not attributing to them a reading of this premise
which their very position commits them to rejecting.
The other critique comes from Anthony Brueckner," who points out that
there are bad arguments for true conclusions, and that a person can therefore reject the standard arguments for logical fatalism without thereby
accepting that there are any possible worlds containing instances of free
agency. (Such persons might think that free agency is impossible because
they think that the relevant concept of 'freedom' is incoherent, or because
they subscribe to some metaphysical position like divine omnificence or
the principle of sufficient reason that they regard as incompatible with free
agency.) Warfield's response is that Brueckner's point, while undeniable,
fails to connect with anything in Warfield's Argument. The relevant
premise of this argument is that (~) and (y) are consistent, not merely that a
certain argument from (y) to the denial of (~) is unsuccessful. Since his
opponent accepts the consistency claim, Warfield maintains that he is entitled to use this claim in arguing against the opponent.
Unfortunately Warfield's entitlement to this claim, even under the favorable B-reading, makes absolutely no difference to the success of his argument. Suppose Warfield's target audience is limited just to those who agree
that there is a possible world in which (~) is true. This audience will assent
to the conditional, if(a) is true, then there is a possible world in which (~) and
(8) are both true. But part of this audience-the very part that Warfield is
trying to win over-has (in the ATI) what it regards as good reasons for
thinking that there is no possible world in which (~) and (8) are both true;
moreover, there is nothing in Warfield's Argument that so much as addresses let alone refutes these reasons. For this audience the above conditional is
the first step in a modus tollens argument demonstrating the untenability of
(a), not a modus ponens proving the consistency of (~) and (8). In the end,
Warfield's Argument simply begs the question against the opposition. 16
IV

Warfield's Argument provided the model I used when constructing The
Proposal, so it's not surprising that it fails in exactly the same way. Similar
Proposal-like efforts to reduce theological to logical fatalism have been
made by Susan Haack, who regards the former as "no more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborated version of the argument for fatalism
discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9,1/17 and by William Lane Craig. IS
It's not clear that an analysis of these arguments would add much to what
has already been said about Warfield's Argument. I suggest then that we
turn for our second example to an argument put forward by Alvin
Plantinga-call it 'Plantinga's Argument'-which exhibits a bit more variation on the theme. 19
Plantinga's Argument is like Warfield's in a number of respects: (i) it is
directed against theological incompatibilists who deny the consistency of
(~) and (8) on grounds provided by the ATI; (ii) it is designed to settle a
key dispute in favor of the ATI' s critics while avoiding a direct engage-
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ment with the ATI's defenders; and (iii) the theological incompatibilists
who constitute the "relevant interlocutors" for the argument are those who
agree with Plantinga that logical fatalism is a nonstarter. But instead of
resting his argument, like Warfield, on the agreed consistency of (~) and
(y), Plantinga appeals to other common ground he shares with his opponents, namely, the judgment that (y) is a so-called "soft fact" about the past.
For readers unfamiliar with the hard facti soft fact distinction and its relevance to fatalism, a little background is in order.
If the (logical or theological) fatalist's argument has the form
P, O(P::JQ), I:. OQ,

it commits a modal fallacy, but if it takes the valid form
OP, O(P::JQ),

I:. OQ

the fatalist must justify premising P as necessary. If P is a so-called "hard"
fact about the past-one that is genuinely and solely about the pasfO-the
premise is arguably justifiable: relative to the present, P would be "accidentally" or "temporally" necessary (not even God, Aquinas notes, can
undo the pasf1). Such necessity would validly "transfer" to Q, and this
implication of the future in the necessity of the past is precisely what the
fatalist is after. (As Richard Taylor, a card-carrying logical fatalist, succinctly explains, "A fatalist ... thinks of the future in the way we all think
of the past."22) But if P is only a "soft" fact about the past-if it is only
superficially about the past, or concerns the future as well as the pastthen oP is unavailable as a premise. Indeed, those who reject logical fatalism typically do so because they agree that the facts that play P's role in the
logical fatalist's argument-facts like
(y)

It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD

-are paradigmatically "soft" facts about the past. (One may also avoid
logical fatalism by denying that there are any such facts as (y), whether
hard or soft; but then neither could an omniscient God know such facts,
making this strategy unavailable to defenders of divine foreknowledge.)
Plantinga is therefore entitled to assume that his theological incompatibilist
opponents who reject logical fatalism will agree with him that propositions
like (y) may be true (since otherwise divine omniscience would not include
the problematic foreknowledge) and that, when true, they constitute mere
soft facts about the past (since otherwise there would be a good argument
for logical fatalism).
With this common ground secured, Plantinga's Argument proceeds as
follows. For divine foreknowledge to be incompatible with human freedom, at least on the grounds cited by the ATI, God's foreknowledge of
creatures' putatively free future actions must be expressible as a hard fact
about the past. Because God's past beliefs about the future count as knowledge only in virtue of the future turning out as God believed it would,
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God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD

is not itself a hard fact about the past. For this reason a sophisticated theological incompatibilist would appeal instead to
(8') God believed in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD,
a proposition that would appear to depend for its truth only on the character of God's past cognitive states and so to constitute a genuinely hard fact
about the past. But Plantinga has an argument to show that (8') no less
than (8) must be a soft fact about the past. The relevant interlocutors agree
that (y) is a soft fact about the past. But given that
(a)

God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possible worlds,

(y) is strictly equivalent to (8'). Since (y) is a soft fact about the past and (y)
is strictly equivalent to (8'), it follows that (8') is also a soft fact about the
past. But this undercuts the theological incompatibilist's only ground for
supposing that (8') is necessary (prior to 2000 AD), and without such
necessity, the AT! cannot succeed. By misidentifying the crucial fact about
the past as hard, the argument for theological fatalism turns out to involve
the same mistake as the argument for logical fatalism.
Plantinga's Argument employs the inference-form

(1 *)
(2)

q is a soft fact about the past
q is strictly equivalent to r

therefore
(3*)

r is a soft fact about the past,

with q = (y) and r = (8'). Is this inference-form valid, and does it remain
valid when its premises are interpreted so that they come out true?
Leaving aside the multiple ways of interpreting 'soft fact' in (1*) and (3*),
substitution-instances of (2) are susceptible to the same two readings as the
second premise of Warfield's Argument. The A-reading of (2), on which q
and r are the very same fact, does make it virtually undeniable that, if q is a
soft fact, r must be a soft fact as well (for any plausible interpretation of
'soft fact'); so construed, the argument-form is surely valid. Unfortunately
the relevant substitution-instance of (2), namely,
(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of It was true
in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD
and God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD-they constitute the very same fact,
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is just as surely false, since the one fact concerns what Plantinga will do and
the other concerns what God cognized. 23
The corresponding B-reading of this premise, namely,
(2~)

In every possible world It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will
climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD have the same
truth-value,

is not similarly dubious (given (a)), but the resulting argument is now of
doubtful validity. For one thing, it's not at all clear that having the same
truth-value in every possible world (as opposed to being the same fact) is
enough to make r a soft fact just because q is a soft fact. This would, at the
very least, require some argument. 24 But even if this inference were granted, there would still be no reason to employ it in the modus ponens favored
by Plantinga rather than the modus tollens favored by his opponents. The
incompatibilist, after all, has offered reasons for thinking that (8') cannot be
a soft fact about the past. 25 If (ex) is true and the set of soft facts is closed
under strict equivalence, these reasons for thinking that (8') cannot be a
soft fact about the past become reasons for thinking that (y) cannot be a soft
fact about the past. But the "relevant interlocutors" all agree that (y) is a
soft fact. Why then shouldn't they conclude, so much the worse for (a)?
Plantinga's Argument, like Warfield's, provides the incompatibilist with
no grounds for revising this judgment. 26
A paradoxical feature of these various efforts to use some substitutioninstance of (2) to preserve human freedom from divine determinism,
whether it is determinism arising from God's exercise of power (as in The
Proposal) or from His knowledge of the future (as in Warfield's Argument
and Plantinga's Argument), is that a less maximalist line on these divine
attributes might make the threat to human freedom more serious. If there is
only "local" omnificence or omniscience-if, for example, everything that I
do, but not everything that everyone does, is uniquely determined or infallibly foreknown by God-nothing in these various arguments is even relevant to showing that the affected agents remain free?7 If there are cogent
grounds for thinking that freedom is abridged when divine determinism
makes God the true cause of an action or when divine foreknowledge precludes all alternatives to the action (and the grounds for the latter, at least,
are admittedly controversial), these grounds should remain cogent as more
and more of what happens gets done by God, and more and more of the
future gets fixed by God's foreknowledge. But according to the compatibility arguments we have been considering, things get worse for human
freedom only until God's agency and/or knowledge achieve complete
ubiquity across events and worlds, at which point the relevant instance of
(2) becomes true and my freedom (and everyone else's) is suddenly
restored. This claim is (to say the least) highly counterintuitive.
It's not clear what the defenders of these arguments could say to make
this result seem even half-way plausible, but the arguments' critics may
suspect where the problem lies. If God's essential omnificence or omniscience means that His uniquely determining Adam to eat, or His infallibly
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foreknowing that Plantinga will climb, is nothing more than the fact of
Adam's eating or Plantinga's climbing, then it's hardly surprising that
these facts about God should have no deleterious implications for human
freedom. But it's also hard to see how' omnificence' and 'omniscience', on
this account, would be more than empty names, or why it should matter
theologically whether God possesses these attributes.

v
Responding to Hasker's charge that he simply assumes the truth of (ex),
Warfield claims that he assumes it only for the purpose of conditional
proof, using it to "show that the consistency of [(~)] and [(8)] follows ... in
just the way that one might argue that causal determinism is incompatible
with human freedom by assuming the truth of determinism and deriving a
'no freedom' conclusion."28 But in fact this is precisely how Warfield's
opponents, the theological incompatibilists, make their case: by assuming
the truth of divine omniscience and deriving a "no freedom" conclusion.
The proper parallel to Warfield's brief for theological compatibilism would
be a (nontheological) compatibilist who replies to the defender of an
incompatibilist argument, like Peter van Inwagen's "Consequences
Argument,"29 as follows:
You and I both agree that (i) there are instances of free agency. I
believe, in addition, that (ii) universal causal determinism is true.
You claim that I should reject (ii) because it is incompatible with (i).
Au contraire, man frere! Given (ii), to which I am entitled for the sake
of argument, and then adding (i), which you cannot begrudge me
because you accept it yourself, it follows that (i) is compatible with (ii).
This absurd petitio principii simply ignores all van Inwagen's reasons for
thinking that causal determinism and freedom of will are not compatible.
Likewise Warfield's Argument simply ignores all the reasons theological
incompatibilists like Jonathan Edwards (who resolves the incompatibility
one way) and William Hasker (who resolves it the other way) have
offered for thinking that infallible foreknowledge and free agency are not
compatible.
Call this type of defense, whose general form is given by omitting the
specific content of (i) and (ii) in the indented passage above, 'The Shorter
Proposal'. (Of its omniscience-version Hasker rightly notes that it does
"everything Warfield's original argument does, with somewhat greater
economy."30) An apparent example of The Shorter Proposal may be found
in Augustine's classic discussion of the problem of divine foreknowledge
v. human freedom in Book III of On Free Choice of the Will, when at the end
of chapter 3 he summarizes the results of his investigation as follows:
Thus, we believe both that God has foreknowledge of everything in
the future and that nonetheless we will whatever we will. Since God
foreknows our will, the very will that he foreknows will be what
comes about. Therefore, it will be a will, since it is a will that he fore-
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knows. And it could not be a will unless it were in our power.
Therefore, he also foreknows this power. It follows, then, that his
foreknowledge does not take away my power, since he whose foreknowledge never errs foreknows that I will have it.3!
In other words, if we begin by assuming (free) will, the truth about reality
will include truths about future freely-willed actions; and if we further
assume an omniscient deity, he will obviously foreknow these truths, since
otherwise he would not know everything. Treated as an argument for the
compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, this passage
from Augustine clearly assumes the very point at issue.
Augustine does, however, do something that Warfield does not do: he
goes on (in chapter 4) to explain how it is, by his lights, that the AT! goes
wrong. The fact that he resolves the problem (to his satisfaction) in chapter
4 is some reason to think that he does not do so in chapter 3, and that the
quoted passage must therefore play some other role in his exposition.
Elsewhere I have argued that Augustine's real objective in chapter 3 is to
encourage in the reader a lively sense that this (so far unresolved) problem
is merely aporetic in nature. 32 For example, when responding to someone
tempted to accept Zeno's Achilles argument, the first step might be to
remind this person of everything that is implausible about Zeno's conclusion, thereby encouraging the suspicion that there must be something
wrong with the argument; and this first step might be accomplished successfully without its contributing anything at all to the second step, which
would be the actual unmasking of the fallacy on which the argument rests.
Likewise, one of Augustine's points in chapter 3 (including the passage
quoted above) is that knowledge per se does not appear to make any difference to its objects: given a situation 5, adding knowledge to 5 ought to
leave the original features of 5 exactly as they were. If the truth is that
Plantinga freely climbs, one would expect divine omniscience (absent some
other exercise of divine power) to simply track this truth. There is something deeply baffling, then, about the idea that divine foreknowledge alone
could overturn the freedom of what might otherwise be a paradigmatic
instance of free agency.33
That it's baffling is not, of course, a proof that it is false. (There are many
baffling truths, and the preemption of human freedom by divine foreknowledge might be one of these.) Nor, for that matter, does the experiential evidence against Zeno's conclusion demonstrate the falsity of the
Parmenidean metaphysics for which Zeno was arguing. These are matters
for further argument. Augustine supplies this further argument in chapter
4. His resolution of the foreknowledge problem turns out to anticipate
Harry Frankfurt's position that a person who cannot do otherwise may
nevertheless be free in the sense required for moral responsibility so long
as the conditions which eliminated the person's alternatives "played no
role at all in leading him to act as he did," so that in their absence "[h]e
would have acted the same."34 Divine foreknowledge, Augustine argues,
is just such an alternative-eliminator ("God's foreknowledge does not force
the future to happen"), and its implications for free will are benign.3'
My purpose here is not to defend Augustine's particular solution to the
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problem, which I have undertaken elsewhere (and which in any case
would require much more than the two sentences at the end of the preceding paragraph!), but to contrast his approach with the fallacious blandishments of The Proposal and its ilk. Libertarians like Plantinga and Warfield
who are compatibilists about human freedom and divine omnscience are
presumably incompatibilists about human freedom and divine omnificence. If they are right on both counts (and I believe that they are), this
must be in virtue of some difference between omniscience and omnificence. Justifying their position requires identifying this difference and
explaining why it makes a difference. Their own arguments, which sidestep this issue, fail to engage their opponents' arguments, leaving them
vulnerable to The Proposal and its defense of divine omnificence.
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NOTES
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Nature of God, ed. Freddoso (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
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(D)

S is omnipotent at t in W if and only if for any state of affairs p and
world-type-for-S Ls such that p is not a member of Ls, if there is a
world W* such that
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simply shift from premise two to premise one; for if (c) and (d) are the same fact,
all the critics' reasons for thinking that (b) is incompatible with (d)-reasons
that The Proposal does not so much as address let alone rebut-become reasons
for thinking that (b) is incompatible with (c), i.e., for thinking that premise one is
false. The A-reading therefore fails to supply a cogent version of The Proposal
whether or not the second premise (on this reading) is judged to be true.
6. Ted. A. Warfield, "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are
Compatible," Nous 31 (1997), pp. 80-86.
7. On Free Choice of the Will, Book III, chaps. 2-3. Concerns about fatalism
based on divine foreknowledge certainly antedate Augustine (e.g., among
Stoic thinkers); but it's not clear that these concerns are really warranted,
given that the deities in question appear to lack one or more of the attributes
(such as essential omniscience and necessary existence) that are crucial to the
argument's success.
8. Nelson Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge and Voluntary Action,"
Philosophical Review 74 Qanuary 1965), pp. 27-46.
9. The same argument-form occurs in Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield,
"Fatalism: Logical and Theological," Faith and Philosophy 16 (April 1999), pp.
233-38, where Finch and Warfield argue that the problem of "theological fatalism"-the problem of the consistency of, e.g., (b) and (d)-is no more difficult
than the problem of "logical fatalism" -the problem of the consistency of, e.g.,
(b) and (g)-if (g) implies (d) (as it does on the assumption that (a) is true). The
reasons I offer for thinking that Warfield's Argument fails are ipso facto reasons
for thinking that the Finch-Warfield argument fails.
10. "On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics," Faith and
Philosophy 17 (April 2000), pp. 255-59. The quoted passages are on page 258.
11. Is it possible that the absurdity of (2a) is merely prima facie, and that
once the full implications of divine omniscience are realized it can be seen that
this second premise is nothing less than the sober truth? Then the problem
with the A-reading will simply shift to premise one-see note 5.
12. "Reply to Two Critics," op. cit.
13. William Hasker, "No Easy Way Out: A Response to Warfield," Nous 32
(1998), pp. 361-63.
14. Warfield, "Reply to Two Critics," p. 256.
15. Anthony Brueckner, "On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility
of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," Faith and Philosophy 17
Qanuary 2000), pp. 132-34.
16. I have also addressed Warfield's Argument on pp. 14-16 of my "On
Augustine's Way Out," Faith and Philosophy 16 Qanuary 1999), pp. 3-26.
17. Susan Haack, "On a Theological Argument for Fatalism," Philosophical
Quarterly 24 (April 1974), pp. 156. Near the end of her brief article Haack sums
up what she takes herself to have shown in this way:
The theological argument may-on account of its greater complexityseem more plausible than the logical argument; but it cannot be more sound.
I suggest, then, that whatever reaction is appropriate to the logical argument for fatalism is also appropriate to the theological argument. (p. 158)
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